House in Iraq

Walter Arnheim dinner

2011-05-31T04:27:00.003+03:00

So I had dinner with Walter Arnheim last night at a chinese restaurant known for its Peking Duck. Located in suburban Virginia, this was a pretty typical strip mall that could have been anywhere in the country. What made the dinner memorable, other than the company, was the decal that we noticed on the window of a nearby drycleaners. It looked so much like Walter that it seemed almost implausible that he did not serve as its model. This was an uncanny doppelganger with a level of resemblance that few can match. He said that the decal is widely used among dry cleaners and that others have contacted him asking if it was really just a coincidence.

Why work in Iraq?

2006-05-31T08:21:00.000+04:00

As I rapidly near the end of my time in Iraq, I've been reviewing the reasons I came in the first place. I was motivated by a range of factors. In no particular order, here's a list of reasons people come to Iraq and how I relate.

Understand the situation first hand: With the level of media coverage devoted to Iraq, one can't help but wonder what the scene is really like on the ground. I wanted to see what was going on in Baghdad with my own eyes. In retrospect, this reason was vague and poorly conceived. Is it possible to know what's really going on in any warzone? From my concrete bubble I can't pretend to know Baghdad, let alone grasp the dynamics that are shaping the future of the country. This was not a major consideration, but it was a reason for coming.

The excitement of working in a warzone: I was surprised when a friend told me that this was an appeal of working in Baghdad. But it seems the threat of death entices a surprisingly large number of people to Iraq. "I couldn't work in Erbil, because its too boring," someone told me. I laughed and said how I relish my time in Erbil where a semi-normal existence is possible. Maybe the lesson is that one man's exhileration is another's fear.

Variety of experiences is healthy: I've often made choices based on the premise that more, different experience is generally a positive thing. Of course, there are plenty of experiences that I can rule out as counterproductive. In general, I think that a new challenge makes a better person. After a year in Iraq, I'm beggining to doubt this. I am concerned about the way that I absorb the lessons from these diverse experiences. If the lessons from the challenge is not synthesized or properly valued, the experience may be useless.

Career advancement: Because of the number of opportunities available in Iraq and the paucity of qualified people to fill them, there are many open posts for less experienced candidates. In some cases, the need for a body to fill the position creates employees who are tremendously incompetent. For example, Michael Ledeen's daughter was horribly underqualified for her job and exhibited gross incompentence (I've heard other stories about her from those who were unfortunate enough to work with her). But I had relevent experience and compensated for holes in my background with motivation and good relations with coworkers who were eager to help and mentor me.

Money: Compensation in Iraq is exorbitant by any standard, and for many people this is the key reason behind their presence in Iraq. It is rarely the only reason and usually there are other motivating factors. For me, I can't complain that my bank account has grown significantly, though I do feel awkward about it. But even if the pay were comparable to similar posts in other countries, which is about half of what I now make, I would still have accepted the position. Actually, I've valued the R&R trips I've taken to Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Belgium/Holland more than the pay.

Making a difference: In the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched I had major reservations about the war and attended anti-war protests. I am less opposed to the invasion now than I was three years ago. However, the legitimacy of the war is not relevant to my decision to come to Iraq or my opinion of the reconstruction efforts. There is important work that needs to be completed and I came to contribute to those efforts. The deeper question is whether I have contributed to these efforts in a unique and meaningful way, or if I have just filled a position that needed a body. My coworkers assure me that it is the former and that I have made a substantive contribution that is not pushing papers or routine. Unfortunately, I'm not convinced and feel like I could have done more.

Professional development: I thought that I would gain some crucial skills in Iraq. Foremost, I wanted to get my Arabic down. I have failed miserably at this and do not have any better grasp of the language than when I arrived. I also hoped that I would have more direction about my long-term career goals. Development projects bring a range of specialists together with unique backgrounds. I expected that after a year I would have enough models that I could comfortably choose a career path that suited me. I am now more uncertain than when I arrived. There are too many people doing important work here for me to choose one area of specialization. Consequently, the question "should I go to law school or business school or a program in IR" is more difficult to answer than it was a year ago. I will most likely be at graduate school in the fall, though I fear an uninspired two years of study. At the same time, I did gain some skills that I did not anticipate. I've developed and conducted numerous training sessions since I've been out here, and my ability as a facilitator and public speaker improved. My superhuman boss gave me a hand in the project management and I gained experience with project design when I took the lead in the developing the implementation plan.

Cultural understanding: One aspect of previous international work that I value is the cultural understanding I gain. In Yemen, I had long qat-fueled debates about the validity of Islam. In Israel, a Bedouin friend explained why the sedentary life traditional to a peasant is difficult to fit with tradition. I can't think of comparable experiences here. Iraqis tell me about their lives, their values, and their aspirations, but from the confines of the compound it seems remote. Also, Iraqis look at Westerners in a much different way than their counterparts in other Arab countries. I arrive with the baggage of an invading power, and Iraqis view me through that prism. Its not surprising that the non-Iraqi Arabs I work with have been more candid about their culture than Iraqis.

Complete change: Iraq has an almost romantic aura that draws people seeking a radical change in their life. There are plenty of people out here who do not fit the typical profile of the development professional, if there is such a thing. They come to Iraq because it is drastically different from anything they've done before. For example, there's the seasoned IT professional who worked in New York but grew tired of the city and his marriage. He came to Iraq though previously he had never travelled anywhere besides Europe. He sought a major paradigm shift that only a radical change of scenery could provide. This was not an appeal to me, though I did hope that I would grow from this experience.

Camraderie: I didn't come to Iraq to make friends. In fact, this was not on my radar. Though many people involved in security work say that this draws them to Iraq. In a warzone relationships take on a certain intensity. Describing his experience in the military, a security manager said that "you work together, sleep together, fight together, and fuck together." I can only relate to the work part, but I have bonded with the rest of the team in ways that I never thought possible. I have made lifelong friends in Iraq and that may be the most important thing I take away from this experience.

Compensation Considerations

2006-05-27T17:09:00.000+04:00

In Iraq, compensation seems mostly unrelated to risk. Jobs that entail the greatest risk of death often pay least, while the cushiest jobs are sometimes the most financially rewarding.

There is no shortage of examples. An enlisted US soldier who spends days on patrols in dangerous areas of Iraq makes a pittance by any standard. Their risk is much greater than PSDs, who sometimes spend weeks without leaving secure areas. Both soldiers and PSDs are here because of their military expertise, but PSD assignments entail fewer risks and their missions are less physically demanding. PSDs are not as much of an insurgent target and have better living facilities. However, the average PSD salary hovers around six figures.

In a comparison of Iraqi and expat salaries, the difference is even more pronounced. Iraqi guards staff the lookouts of most compounds and the perimeter security. They're the first ones that would be killed if there were an attack, and as collaborators in the eyes of insurgents, they're more of a target after they leave work. Though these Iraqis serve as the first line of defense and possess years of experience, their wages are typically an order of magnitude less than their expat supervisors.

This same disparity exists outside of security work. Local staff are the engine behind most development projects. This is more the case in Iraq than elsewhere, because Western staff are not able to travel freely. Though Iraqi staff, even those in senior managerial positions, rarely make more than $2,000 a month. No expat I know would stay in Iraq one day if their salary were anywhere near that level.

I've never heard an Iraqi protest this situation. Some have joked with me that they'd prefer a foreign passport and an expat job in Iraq than asylum in a Western country. Iraqis are pleased to have a job amidst the high unemployment rate and the desperate economic situation. Working for Western firm, their salary is still much higher than if they were employed by an Iraqi company. This does create some awkward situations. An aging waiter told me about a boy cleaning the sidewalk who worked for a development contractor. Though a teenager, the cleaner's salary was several times more than the waiter's. There are economic consequences to these distorted salaries, which are mostly negative. An Iraqi doctor I know performed hundreds of surgeries under Saddam. Though now he'd never go back to work as a doctor. His job as a medical advisor to a relief organization pays him three or four times more than the $300 or $400 Iraqi doctors take home in a month.

How to remedy this situation? One suggestion is to modify the allowance schedule to more accurately compensate for risk. Right now, most development contractors receive a 70% bonus on their base salary. This accounts for some of the disparity in pay between locals and expats. This bonus consists of 35% for danger and 35% for hardship (or post-diffential, in development-ese). However, the danger pay is the same for a post in Erbil where security detail is unnecessary or a base in Anbar whether mortars land every day. The percentages are decreed by the State Department on a country-by-country basis with a few intra-country fluctuations. These rates should be revised with much more geographic specificity and updated as the situation changes. Similarly, the 35% hardship allowance should only apply in situations of genuine hardship. Even if this doesn't remedy the pay disparity, in the interest of fairness this should change. Some development workers in Sudan are living without water or electricity though their rate is only 25%.

This wouldn't resolve the disparity in pay for Iraqis like the waiter and the cleaner, or my surgeon friend and his government counterparts. For the sake of fairness though, the Iraqis should be receive a bonus based on their risk. But this is hardly realistic given the range of factors that contribute to risk in Iraq. Would Iraqis be paid more if they came from an ethnic group that was more likely to be killed? There aren't any solutions. The problem is rooted in basic supply and demand. There are too many unemployed, unskilled Iraqis, and too few expats who will come to Iraq. With so many Iraqis eager to work, danger pay isn't necessary as an incentive. If the extra pay created additional productivity, this wouldn't be a cause for concern, but that's not the case. Maybe the excessive pay for expats helps forget these questions.

Foosball and Baathism

2006-05-23T00:12:00.000+04:00

In stark contrast to the difficulties of wiping out the insurgency, the visible remnants of the former regime have been completely removed. Driving through Baghdad, the places where statues stood or paintings of Saddam glowered are easily identifiable. But the pictures have been painted over and the statues removed. The palaces that still stand are unmistakably Saddam's, but these are home to US government operations, and their former purpose and history is only evident in the architecture or the lore that surrounds certain features.

One piece of Iraqi history that is easy to overlook is the tomb of the intellectual father of Ba'athism, Michel Aflaq. His name is usually mentioned before his co-founder, Salah al-Din Bitar, because Aflaq was born a Christian. Both were European-educated Syrian intellectuals who worked as school teachers and later in the Ministry of Education. After a falling out with the Ba'athist Syrian government, Aflaq sought refuge in Iraq. Saddam was eager to bolster his Ba'athist credentials and welcomed Aflaq in return for his support.

Wikipedia's entry mentions that Aflaq is buried in the Green Zone, on the site of the new American embassy. The construction site of the future American embassy is vast, easily three or four times the mall in Washington by my estimates. A recent article tries to depict its size, but it seems even more expansive than the description. Soldiers manning the site told me that the embassy will be a virtual city, complete with its own water and trash collection services.

Last Friday I went to visit the grave. The PSDs who had to escort me were not pleased and had little patience for tourist excursions. I didn't know the location of "FOB Union III" and lost among the embassy construction, it was difficult to find. As foreign nationals, they weren't allowed to enter the premises, and we exited our armoured vehicle and walked the five minutes from the entrance of the base to the mausoleum.

The exterior of Aflaq's tomb

Aflaq is rumoured to have embraced Islam before he died. Apparently, whoever planned his burial did not want to leave any doubt about his religious affliation. The exterior of the mausoleum, which looks like a traditional mosque.

When you look inside, and before you get to the headstone, you pass a foosball table. Weights and a bench press are adjacent to the tomb. The US military has converted the interior to a rec room. A dusty chandelier is attached to the ceiling, which is decorated with a sort of faux-mosaic. The walls have been covered with wood, for reasons that are not immediately evident. Perhaps to allow for bookshelves? Two stairs lead down from either side of the grave to cramped, makeshift barracks constructed with plywood. There are dozens of soldiers who live beneath Aflaq's grave. The empty display cases next to the rooms suggest that the area might have been a museum earlier.

A view from the entrance

A lone book and water bottle sit on the tomb, which is covered in dust. The inscription on the headstone features Sura al 'Asr, and does not say who is interred.

Paying proper respect?

What will happen to this landmark in the future? Compelling but flawed arguments can be made for its destruction. Baathism was a fascist ideology, and its founder should not be commemorated. However, it was only in practice that Baathism became odious. As it was conceived by Aflaq, Baathism was grounded in freedom, nationalism, socialism, and Pan-Arabism. Incompatible ideals, perhaps, but few intellectual systems are flawless. Leaders like Saddam and the Assads in Syria distorted the ideology and used it as a source of legitimacy for their baseless, corrupt dictatorships. Aflaq envisioned a secular, modern state that united the Arab people across sectarian and national rifts. As Iraqis struggle for a post-Saddam national identity, surely that is a vision worth preserving.

Dumb luck?

2006-05-17T18:01:00.000+04:00

The security manager uses a sophisticated program called FalconLite to plan the routes of his team's missions. It's similar to the Google map program, but has more views and offers a unique set of overlays that detail the location of every "sigact," which in non-military speak means any enemy action that's significant enough to record. Most of the sig acts are IEDs, though after the bombing in Sammara, the program started recording the number of murders. I placed the overlay of all the incidents that have happened in Baghdad since the beginning of the month. Though we're just a little more than half way through May, nearly all of the map is covered with incidents and our compound is completely obscured.

This makes me grateful that in the time I've been here, we've never been attacked. The reason for this is a matter of some debate. The PSDs, ever wary, contend that it's only a matter of time and attribute our record to dumb luck. I prefer to think that Iraqis can tell we're not with the military, and aren't bothered by our presence. There's no official policy barring them, but I've never seen coalition forces enter the compound. Also, many Iraqis know that we're creating jobs and trying to improve lives. Of course the Zarqawis aren't able to look beyond our nationalities and would be happy to take us out all the same. But as targets go, we're lower on the list because of the work we're doing.

Though there have been some close calls.

A few months ago, an explosion on the main street outside the compound caused the building to shake. No one was killed in the blast and after a few minutes of trying to glimpse the damage from my window, I went back to work. Apparently, there were plenty of explosives packed in the car. Though the car was parked almost 100 yards away, the door handle, pictured above, was launched into the compound and landed next to our generator, a few steps away from the entrance to our building. Despite the close proximity, the consensus is that the compound was not targeted. Amazingly, the cars adjacent to the IED were damaged but still operable after the explosion. The force was diffuse and not channeled properly, which lead some to comment that it was detonated prematurely.

Recently, the insurgents seem to have a new target: liquor stores. The recent attacks on stores selling alcohol have taken place in our neighborhood. If these insurgents knew the amount of inebriants that are consumed in the compound, it would certainly outweigh any points earned from our development work.

Baghdad Signage

2006-05-12T17:05:00.000+04:00

One of my Iraqi coworkers regularly laments the situation in Baghdad during our conversations. Recently, she's been complaining less about the Americans and focused more on the Iranians. Strangely, she believes that the Americans are partnering with the Iranians to exploit Iraq. She reaches this conclusion from the premise that the Americans are omnipotent as they are the most powerful country in the world. Consequently, since there is Iranian influence in Iraq, the Americans must be encouraging it.

She emailed me this picture of a sign in her neighborhood, Adhamiya. The part in red reads "Entry Forbidden to Police..." and the text that follows (I needed alot of help with this part) continues with adjectives describing the police "....the followers of Solagh, [the interior minister] the Iranian fire-worshippers ['majoos,' an epithet related to Zoroastrianism], to the grounds of
Adhamiya."

I asked some Iraqis why the sign was posted. Was it because Adhamiya has its own militia and doesn't want challenges to its authority and control? Or is it that the police, because of their connections to Iran, are not trusted? The response I received was "Where did you get that picture from?" I think its more the latter, as even my Shiite coworkers agree that the police have been infiltrated by Iranian intelligence.

Musings about the Military

2006-05-10T19:45:00.000+04:00

One of the assumptions that grounds much of the thinking about Iraq is that more troops will create more stability. The point is central to the lucid and well-cited Brookings' strategy paper. The authors, including the eminent Ken Pollack, advocate 20 security personnel for every 1,000 Iraqis (excluding Kurdistan). By their calculations, this requires an army of 450,000, which is double the current level of Iraqi and Coalition forces.

But do more "boots on the ground" bring greater stability? At first it seems that this must be the case. More troops provide greater surveillance. It's soldiers will catch Zarqawi and are detaining insurgents. These forces are finding weapons caches before they fall into the hands of the enemy.

However, troops and especially Coalition forces have the potential to alienate large portions of the population. There's a story I heard from an ex-serviceman about a convoy in Kirkuk. Some MNF vehicles were lingering beside a market. An old man walked up to one of the humvees and dropped a grenade in the door. He didn't flee while it detonated, killing himself and several Americans. Why? His family's house was searched a few days earlier, and his wife was frisked. The fellow had no ties to the insurgency. The anger that resulted from the humiliation boiled over. His story, while unusual, is not unique. Many of my Iraqi friends have shared similar hostility against Coalition troops that mistreated them.

Clearly, there's a tradeoff here. Troops gather intel and capture insurgents, saving lives and bringing stability. But there's a cost in the numbers of Iraqis that are alienated, which leads to more insurgent attacks and greater instability. One factor that's never mentioned in this calculation is that American troops in downtown Baghdad are an affront to Iraqi pride. Moderate Iraqis - my project's staff - don't feel secure when they see an American tank on the street. The reaction is better characterized as resentment. Fortunately, they're level-headed enough that it would take alot of aggravation to push them towards violence. From what I can tell, this hostility does not exist towards Iraqi troops to the same degree. The Brookings' paper advocates protecting the civilian population as the key to stability, but because of the tradeoff it cannot be done effectively with foreign troops.

What would happen if non-Iraqi troops were taken off the streets? This is not a suggestion for withdrawal, but an arrangement similar to what the US maintains in Saudi Arabia or Turkey, where there are large numbers of troops among a less-than-friendly population. If the Saudi monarchy were threatened and their own forces were inadequate, the US would probably call on the resources at these bases. Otherwise, the troops stationed there sit tight. Though most Saudis detest the US presence, because the troops never appear on the streets of Riyadh, there is little overt animosity and few attacks.

Similarly, what would happen if the US never left its bases in Iraq unless there was something that was absolutely critical to the future of the Iraq? Unearthing a new weapons cache or finding a safe house is important, but its not critical to the future of Iraq. Critical is something that would overthrow the government or cause a large portion of the country to come under insurgent control. If that happens, the US would emerge from its base and bring its firepower. Otherwise, the troops would sit back in Camp Victory or wherever and let Iraqis do the dirty work.

Someone who's served with the US Army in Iraq has pointed out that this wouldn't work for several reasons. First, Iraqi troops aren't ready. Second, you need American troops to gather intelligence (psyops, as he put it). Third, unless you have regular patrols, large parts of the country would fall under insurgent control.

I won't contest the perception that most Iraqi troops are ill-prepared and poorly trained. But these small tasks - going door to door, gathering intel, finding weapons caches - seems like an excellent way to build their skills. Perhaps these Iraqi troops can also do "psyops," or this skill can be taught from the safety of a US base without ever having US troops leave their base. There is reason to doubt the effectiveness of these operations, anyway. Eventually, the Iraqis will have to do these tasks on their own, and its better that we start now with duties that are not mission critical.

Regular patrols are necessary to ensure that areas stay safe and free from insurgent control. Iraqis can do this, too, though not as well as foreign troops. But Coalition forces are not completing this task perfectly, anyway. Certain parts of Baghdad are still "no go" and have a large insurgent presence. Key cities - Fallujah, Ramadi, Baqubah, etc. - have come under insurgent control despite these patrols. Again, these regular coalition patrols may be one of the reason the population in these places would harbor insurgents in the first place.

And another comment I received after I made this suggestion: The US doesn't back down. This is a silly point. Surely accomplishing our objectives and bringing stability to the country is more important than misguided displays of machismo. At best, keeping troops on the bases would reduce the number of US casualties, decrease civilian support for the insurgents, and increase the capacity of the Iraqi army. At worst, this would increase the turmoil and the level of violence, though the country may be heading in that direction anyway.

Promoting US Accomplishments

2006-05-09T14:31:00.000+04:00

The Washington Post has excellent coverage of a new USDA initiative to increase support for US work in Iraq. Their tactic: subtly insert the message into speeches whenever possible. The article cites a memo that provides examples of transitions for speechwriters that are anything but seamless. Apparently, the USDA saves the text and then compiles a "weekly account sent to the White House." What does the White House do with USDA speeches praising US efforts in Iraq? How could that possibly be useful to anyone?

In a more sensible move to strengthen public relations, USAID has finally decided to release several of the neverending stream of reports that I submit. No doubt this will bolster American support for the war, change the media's appreciation of reconstruction efforts, and dramatically improve the President's approval ratings. One story, about our anti-corruption work in Anbar governorate, was penned six months ago. Another piece, "Supporting Women in Traditional Communities" was written a few months later and posted here. Right now the USAID link doesn't work, though the first paragraph is visible from the main page. I've emailed the webmaster without any result. At this rate, the country might be stabilized before this project's success stories have been published. Though half the links won't work.

USAID actively discourages contractors from contacting the media and promoting our accomplishments. They have their own communications office which is supposed to coordinate such matters. It sure does make sense that we're denied this authority. How could anyone but the US government possess the genius that it took to craft the USDA's communication strategy on Iraq?

(Update: They fixed the link to the Women's Training)

Solving DC Problems

2006-05-05T02:49:00.000+04:00

A DC non-profit launched a contest to solicit ideas to improve DC. It's strange that the winner will receive $5,000, as nothing listed seems ingenious enough to merit that payout. Anyone reading this before tomorrow's deadline for entries should submit their ideas.

I've entered a few. Most are ideas that I've had since I lived in DC and the contest was good opportunity to put them into writing.

Pimp My Street - The comment critical of the use of 'pimp' is oversensitive. I know the meaning of the term and it's a dumb point. But maybe I'm just too insensitive.
A Realistic Solution to DC's Gun Problem - Not "realistic," but it would shake things up some and I'd like to see it happen.
A Truly DC Mentorship Program - Nothing really DC about it, but I would participate in this if it existed.
Elected Officials' Office Hours - I would go if they were held. I encouraged a politician friend to hold his own but was unsuccessful.
Putting the "N" Back in the ANC - Not the African National Congress. Every DC resident should attend their ANC meeting, at least once.

I just had an idea that is far superior to all of these. What if this were done for Iraq? I've only heard American's ideas for improving the country or the occasional Iraqi politician. Most are silly and uninspired. Add more troops! Improve the capacity of the Iraqi Army! Partner with Iran on issues of mutual concern! Secure the borders! Get the government formed and working! And recently - partition the country! The only one that seems mildly forward-thinking was something along the lines of creating stable enclaves like the Green Zone and then expanding these areas (I'm not going to try and find the link, but I think the author strangely called it a 'oil slick' or something similar). That idea, though novel, isn't feasible anyway.

I'm fortunate enough to be working on a project that could actually make an idea like this a reality. I'm seriously going to propose an Iraqi sister site to solvingdcproblems.com. Solution to the District's Gun Problem

Our Dining Options

2006-04-07T23:48:00.000+04:00

I’ve visited two restaurants in Iraq. This excludes the fast food joints on military bases, which aside from their location are no different than anything found in a US mall. Both of the restaurants are located in our restricted compound. The restaurants are hardly authentic Iraqi bistros and each has its own distinctive character.

There are four hotels in the compound and the two with restaurants are located opposite each other. Though they’re fully functioning with a concierge, gift shop, and room service, itinerant visitors are unknown. The various organizations in the compound have rented out rooms, floors, and entire buildings for their operations, and anyone without business at one of these organizations is not allowed entrance.

The hotel owners must be pleased after their Iraqi clientele was replaced by the current mix of contractors, journalists, and security workers. Though the properties are now off-limits to most, the current occupants pay upfront for year-long leases and have deep pockets. There’s little upkeep required, as the tenants handle their own maintenance and repair. Nearby hotels visible from my window are closed down and abandoned. Hotels fortunate enough to be on the perimeter of the compound remain afloat from guests visiting the compound who don’t stay inside.

Most of the hotels were renovated after the war and their exteriors were lined with ten-foot high concrete slabs. With the blast walls in place, the faded exteriors do not lose anything. One of the hotels, which has zigzagging brick exterior, may have been impressive during its prime but is now faded and unremarkable. The color on the other hotels is difficult to discern, as their concrete walls have accumulated a thin layer of sand, blending in well with the protective walls and the city’s haze. Looking off into the horizon, the sand color seems to absorb everything. The fixture of every Baghdad rooftop, the satellite dish, and the ubiquitous palm trees all fade into the horizon’s hazy mix of sand, sun, and smog.

The interior design in the restaurants may be a conscious attempt to help patrons forget that they’re in Baghdad. The larger, more popular restaurant makes every effort to appear as a verdant oasis. The plush green velvet curtains match the upholstery on the chairs. The framed pictures feature vases overflowing with flowers surrounded by fruit. The ploy works and the interior of the restaurant could be anywhere, but its most likely a developing country. Plastic shrubs are placed at the entrance to the restaurant and the table’s centerpiece is anchored by a fake rose.

Both restaurants have a basic, yet functional stage, near the center of the tables. The stage is nothing more than a place for a keyboardist and a few speakers, but when the performance takes place, it’s as though the whole restaurant is a concert hall where the audience must sit through a horrible opener to get to the main act. Though at the restaurant, there is no headliner, only the food, and the opening act is the only one for the night. Patrons lucky enough to visit after the playing has started strategically position themselves away from the speaker, for the sake of their conversation and eardrums.

Once, the keyboardist played the theme to “A Fistful of Dollars” which is also one of the songs from “Kill Bill.” I had the song in my head and was excited to hear it, so I put a dollar in his usually empty jar. Now, whenever I enter the restaurant and he’s playing, I can expect to hear the song within a few minutes. However, not everyone in the restaurant dislikes the music. The Iraqi waiters are thoroughly entertained by the performances. I don’t have any evidence for this other than the fact that the live music continues, so someone must appreciate it, and its clearly not the expats.

I don’t notice the food very much. Its edible and the menus at the two restaurants are similar. No mention of a menu written by a non-native English speaker would be complete without citing an error. My favorite gaffe is the “Meatbolls” entrée for $4. The first time I ordered it I was hoping that the “o” was not the mistake but the first “l” and was excited that I might get to try my first meatbowl. As it turns out, I probably order the meatball dish the most. Like most of the dishes on the menu, it’s never the same. Sometimes it comes with vegetables, the sauce is occasionally in a separate bowl, and the number of meatballs ranges from 6 to as many of 10. Maybe I do notice the food more than I thought.

The food does keep with some of the few features of Iraqi cuisine I know. There are plenty of tomatoes, and chicken is a staple. The meat is generally well done and dry by Western standards. I’ve heard the suggestion that this is because of a Muslim aversion to blood in food, but I haven’t found anything in the doctrine that would support this. Both restaurants give nods to Westerner’s interest in sampling the local cuisine, peppering the menu with “Iraqi tikka,” “Iraqi kebab,” and “Iraqi chicken.” These dishes, too, are never prepared the same way twice.

I started writing this to explain my preference for one restaurant over the other. I like the waiters at my favorite restaurant. They greet me with “Habibi,” know my name, and ask me about my R&R whenever I don’t see them for an extended period. They know I like the spaghetti and that I want extra vegetables. When I order takeaway, they recognize my number when it comes up on their cellphone.

I’ve also chosen favorites because I try to avoid the waiters at the more popular of the two restaurants, the one that makes a more aggressive attempt to distance itself from the squalor of Baghdad. Though it’s not because of the waiters themselves, but their dress. Everyday, they wear formal attire, including bowties. They don’t serve their treys with a cocked wrist, but they might as well. Its highly inappropriate for a warzone. Iraqis are dying by the thousands and the country is in turmoil and we’re out here to do something to improve the situation. Flourishes like tuxedo-wearing waiters are slap in the face to the whole mission. If the work is nothing more than collecting inflated salaries, avoiding death, and living it up as much as possible, then the tuxedoed waiters have a place. But if development is about helping people, about partnering and achieving mutual goals, then we’re not here to be served and flaunt our pampered status.

The Airport is Half Full

2006-03-18T23:24:00.000+03:00

My coworker and I have much different perspectives on Arbil International Airport and what it means for the future of Iraq.

I see the airport as a sign of Kurdistan's steady development. Flights arrive daily from Baghdad and Amman and there are less frequent flights from other international destinations, such as Stockholm, Athens, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. Kurdistan's new flagship carrier, Kurdistan Airways, started operations this year and is adding more destinations regularly. The region is becoming more integrated with Europe through Austrian Airlines, which is set to be the first Western carrier operating in Iraq, flying a Vienna to Arbil route. The airport's development is sure to strengthen Arbil's links to the rest of the world and increase investment in Iraq.

"Now, direct flights to Frankfurt!" - Kurdistan Airways

While the road to the airport is a dusty, barren, and awaiting construction, the airport itself is clean and well-maintained. The border guards are professional, and the custom officials don't bother you. They've invited me in for coffee when waiting for my flights. They're idle which suggests a bloated bureaucracy. I prefer to see it as an appreciation for unobstructed commerce and Middle Eastern hospitality.

The most promising sign is a booth that's been recently installed to greet visitors immediately after clearing customs. Though I've never seen it staffed, its directed to tourists and contains pamphlets in Arabic and English about all the great places to visit in Kurdistan. Perusing the guide, most of the destinations seem to be waterfalls, though there are plenty of other tourist draws. This is a drastic change from the tourism strategy for the rest of Iraq, which is centered on keeping visitors away. It wont be long before there's a Lonely Planet written for Kurdistan, and hopefully the new edition covering the whole of Iraq will follow.

A new Iraqi Tourism Information Center. Never staffed, but still a sign of progress.

A co-worker, who is twice my age and has been to a few more developing countries, ridicules the airport. Its classic third-world planning, he says, pointing to the conveyor belt for the luggage which is about the size of my office. To him this shows a complete lack of foresight. There are no departure signs and none of the exits are clearly labeled. There are pictures of Barzani throughout, as found in any dictatorship. He points to the Kalashnikov-wielding peshmergas at the entrance alongside plain clothed guards, and says this place is as insecure as anywhere else in Iraq.

The airport is also emblematic of Kurdistan's uncertain status. Since Turkey doesn't recognize the region, Kurdistan Airways can't fly through Turkish airspace. Some flights are recoded with an international partner, while other fly first to Baghdad and leave from there, skirting Turkey.

If my coworker is right and the airport does become obsolete in the long run, most of the air traffic will be going to Baghdad instead. This will mean that the security situation has improved, which will benefit Iraq and Arbil.

Will it work this time?

2006-03-17T10:19:00.000+03:00

From the confines of our compound, most of the action last night was from round one of the tournament. Otherwise, it was business as usual. Looking from our rooftop, a few helicopters were firing flares. We see plenty of helicopters every night, which fly at a higher altitude than during daylight. There was no indication that the US had launched its largest air campaign since 2003, which we learned about through the BBC.

A coworker who has previous experience in the military thinks these night patrols are useful as a "show of force." The pictures of all the helicopters lined up on the runway before the Samarra operations suggest that this is part of the military's tactic. The reasoning doesn't make sense to me. Do the planners believe that the insurgents forgot that there are 130,000 American troops in their country? If the rationale behind the new air assault was to destroy insurgent operations in Samarra, it's been tried before. Maybe this time it will be successful, but it seems more likely that the insurgents will move to another area.

A Night Out in Baghdad

2006-03-16T20:32:00.000+03:00

It goes without saying that options are limited here, but I know that many Americans working in Iraq have it much worse. Though we're not in the Green Zone, our compound is home to several other international development organizations and we have a decent bar. It's open to anyone in the compound, as well as the Iraqis that work in the compound or have permission to enter. Inside, dominoes is surprisingly popular. Darts, ping-pong, and pool are all available, played on tables that are functional but show their age. I've tried to start a Scrabble following, but have not found too much interest.

As a poker player, when I learned that there was a regular Wednesday game I was thrilled. However, its not like any poker night I've played before. Its organized by Serbian security contractors who have not been influenced by ESPN and have an aversion to hold 'em or even stud. With their pockets deep from six-figure salaries and their mind numb from the stress and monotony, they want something that doesn't require much thought. Their game of choice is "guts" which is easy to learn and requires as much skill as going to the bathroom. Despite the silliness of the game, hundreds of dollars change hands.

DVDs are cheap and readily available, so many of us stay in, spending even more time staring at a screen. I have all five seasons of the West Wing on DVD that look so professional I could mistake them for the originals. Now that I've found a coworker who goes to the market regularly, I'm watching each of the Oscar nominees for $2 each.

Our security team, who are mostly South Africans, used to provide barbeques, or Braiis. They've recently been reprimanded for their raucous behavior. Some of the staff were dismissed and the events have been curtailed. Its unfortunate, as that was some of the best seasoned meat that I've ever eaten. More reason to go to South Africa someday.

Another Curfew

2006-03-15T20:27:00.000+03:00

With the new session of the National Assembly set to convene tomorrow, a curfew has been set for Baghdad. Its well-timed, considering the dozens of tortured bodies that are now unconvered daily. I expect that events will proceed smoothly. We'll be working, though our Iraq staff will stay at home.

Recently, I haven't been following Iraqi politics too closely, so I don't know if the new government will be the coalition of national unity that the US wanted or the Shi'te majority that the votes may allow. It seems that whatever the makeup, there will be a Islamist flavor to the new government. For expats who can leave, the most pertinent concern is whether or not alcohol will be banned. Its no longer available at the airport, though it's easily obtainable elsewhere. For Iraqis who can't leave, a major worry is the personal status law. This is written in the constitution and permits religious groups to enact their own laws governing individual behavior.

Whatever laws the new Iraqi government enacts, its comforting that there are plenty of countries where religion influences national policy in more peculiar ways. Right now in Thailand, Prime Minister Thaksin is using wands and black magic to quell his opposition. In Sri Lanka, the national time is going to be changed on the advice of Buddhist astronomers.

An Unusual Warning

2006-03-14T18:57:00.000+03:00

I follow the litany of security reports in Baghdad just as I do the State Department's travel warnings to foreign countries. Both change regularly, both are mildly alarmist, and both generally discourage you from doing things that you would not do anyway.

I wouldn't travel to Doura or Taji, two of the hottest places in Baghdad, regardless of what our security advisors say. Similarly, on my recent visit to Sri Lanka, I didn't need the state department's travel advisory to discourage me from visiting areas of Tamil-Singhalese friction. Commonsense.

However, the recent security reports have caused my ears to perk up. Explosives, we're told, were found at Baghdad international airport. There's no definitive account of what happened at this point. Open-source media say that the only certain details are the official US warning. Word on the street is that an airline has made an official announcement saying that a cigarette box containing explosives were found on the plane. Our security staff, with their usual subtlety, has discouraged anyone from flying from the airport and hint at imminent death. Of course the explosives would down the plane, we're warned.

I think what I find disconcerting is that there's so little clarity about what happened. The security at Baghdad International Airport is tight, but not impenetrable. I chatted with some co-workers about which was more likely, an inside job from one of the many Iraqi security staff that work there, or someone from the outside carrying the explosives in their pocket. This whole story could be perpetuated on these unresolved water cooler conversations. Its not surprising that Reuters cites unconfirmed reports from private security contractors. Maybe there weren't any explosives involved at all. Still, I'm pleased not to be flying anytime soon.

A possible reason this is on my mind could be a recent security presentation that was forwarded to me. It presents all the ways that you might die in Iraq, complete with full-color pictures of rocket propelled grenades, Kalashnikovs, and land mines. This picture, of an Improvised Explosive Device, or IED, was the most striking. It claims the most victims of any insurgent weapon and is the focus of a new strategy to defeat the insurgency. I learned what one looks like recently.

Our security manager has posted this image near the exit to our quarters, so we pass it every time we leave the compound to face this danger. I've discouraged him from doing this, saying that it isn't helpful. Why don't you tell me what I should do when I hear incoming fire or make sure that I know the emergency procedures? I ask because I'm uninformed about these issues, which I think are vital. He gives me a dismissive look and scoffs at the suggestion that I have any idea about these matters. To him, I know nothing, while he's an authority. After all, he's a PSD team leader with multiple years of work in Iraq who has been wounded by shrapnel from an IED.

Inshallah Airlines

2006-03-01T03:57:00.000+03:00

I've spent the last three days trying to fly from Arbil to Baghdad. The first flight had good reason to be cancelled. Baghdad was under curfew and if the plane arrived, would any of the passengers be able to leave the airport? Our security staff said they would be able to pick me up from Baghdad International Airport, despite the lockdown, and I went to the airport hoping that the plane would leave. After waiting for a few hours, we were told that there would not be any flights to Baghdad. That was Sunday. The Iraqi Airways manager said something about the flight being cancelled the next day, too.

Monday, I received an explanation that "technical difficulties" had grounded the flight. The airport was curiously empty. It seems that most of the passengers heeded the warning.

I arrived at the airport yesterday optimistic that I would be successful on my third attempt. The departure hall was packed, but it only meant that more people would share my disappointment. The explanation? Barzani felt like he needed to head off to Istanbul, and commandeered the Iraqi Airways flight.

I'm perfectly happy to stay in Arbil. I've told the staff here that I'll leave when we are certain the plane is going to take off. The manager hinted that Barzani would need the plane for two days. On a positive note, I did get to bond with my fellow passengers. We're going to encourage Talabani, Jafari, and anyone else who might have oversight of the airline to rename the company "Inshallah Airlines." Also, the seats in Arbil International Airport do not have armrests in between them, making it easy to sprawl out and sleep while waiting for flights to be cancelled.

I am not too concerned about returning to Baghdad. I don't know how much worse the situation will become, but it seems that the curfew has done a good job of lessening the tension after the mosque bombing. The number killed during the wave of violence - 1300 - is huge even by Iraq standards, and I'm sure there is more to follow. However, I think that eventually things will return to normal in Baghdad, if there is such a thing. From the safety of our compound, this means more thuds, and further restrictions on travel within Baghdad.

A Helpful Explanation

2006-02-27T06:39:00.000+03:00

Conversation with a Kurdish co-worker during the 2.5 hour drive from Arbil to Sulaymaniyah

Co-worker: I used to work for [a different international development organization] before I worked for yours.
Housediggity: Really? How did you like it at the [different international development organization]?
Co-worker: I didn't like it much at all. My supervisor was Serbian. You know, the Serbs are alot like the Kurds. We have both been beaten and fought and suffered. We have many repressed feelings that we release on others when we can.
Housediggity: [chuckles] Interesting. I didn't know that. I'm glad you like your new job better.

Sketchy Views

2006-02-12T20:27:00.000+03:00

I was alerted to the possible repercussions from the Danish cartoons by one of my Iraqi co-workers. It was a day after an unusually high number of thuds. Most sounded as if they came from bombs detonated nearby. The New York Times, in their January 30 coverage, was clueless about the rationale, speculating that Zarqawi might now be renewing attacks on Christian sites. I didn't believe one of the Iraqis who told me it was in response to the cartoons, because I thought that was many news cycles ago and that the insurgents had different motives. But now that this seems to have irked the Muslim world more than the war in Iraq, I believe him.

Not surprisingly, our Iraqi staff here have plenty of different takes on the cartoons. The Iraqi who first told me the bombings were due to the cartoons is not shy how silly he thinks this whole thing is. At the same time, he made sure that no one else was looking at the monitor when he showed them to me. Most of the staff seem to agree that the cartoons were in poor taste, but do not in any way hold me or the West responsible.

That's what confuses me most about the response to the cartoons. How could Denmark possibly be culpable? I can understand why the Muslim community would want the worst fate for the cartoonists, and maybe the newspaper. After what happened to Salman Rushdie following the Satanic Verses, death for blasphemy is not surprising. But how is Denmark responsible? In most Arab countries the media is government controlled, though most Arabs know that's not the case elsewhere. Perhaps there are too many cartoonists invovled to attack each artist so its easier to hold the country responsible. Would renaming the "Danish cartoons" as the "Westergaard, Refn..etc. Cartoons" stem the protests? Maybe the newspaper has been spared because "Jyllandsposten Cartoons" is too difficult to say. What seems most likely is that the response was too visceral and immediate to identify a proper target.

One of my coworkers did tell me that though she was offended by the cartoons, hurting the Dane on the street was not justified. However, she has no choice but to participate in the boycott. All the stores have been stripped of Danish goods. She would happily eat her Danish-made cheese for breakfast as she does normally, but its not an option any more. I wonder how much of the response to these cartoons is a grassroots movement, and how many of the protestors are people like my coworker who do not feel strongly opposed to the cartoons or the inappropriate response. The implication from that question is not that an Arab regime is orchestrating everything.

Professor Cole's post about the cartoons does explain why the Danish government might be a target. The government might be in a position to punish the paper, but has not done anything.

Above: A cartoon forwarded to me by a coworker.

Another Overlooked Story

2006-02-11T00:07:00.000+03:00

Names have been changed, but everything else is as it was told to me:

When IIII trainer Fatima Al-Iraqiya arrived in the village of Al-Miyya, she was shocked by the audience that assembled for her two-day workshop. Attending her training entitled “Women’s Rights in the New Constitution” were two dozen men but not a single woman. The tribal leader who helped arranged the training, Sheikh Abu Al-Miyya, offered an explanation: In some villages, women attend these sorts of events. But Al-Miyya is more traditional, he explained, and women are expected to remain at home.

Located on the outskirts of Karbala, Al-Miyya numbers just over a thousand inhabitants. Agriculture forms the basis of the economy, and most of the land is used for date farming. Al-Iraqiya, one of the IIII trainers, targeted Al-Miyya as part of IIII efforts to reach as many women as possible, especially those in more remote areas.

Though she was disappointed, Al-Iraqiya knew that pleading with Sheikh Abu Al-Miyya to change his mind would be futile. She proceeded with her training, sticking to the material she had prepared and the activities she had planned. The first part of the workshop outlined the course and focused on defining the terms that she would use over the next two days. The men listened attentively as she continued through the lesson plan. After an hour, she gently posed a question, “Would it be all right if the men allowed their wives to attend the workshop?” There was plenty of space on the carpets where the participants sat.

Their answer was, “Yes.” The women would sit separately from the men, but they would be able to participate in the workshop. Al-Iraqiya asked that the group take a break and waited for the women to arrive. When the workshop resumed, there were more than 20 women. The following day, among the 45 participants, women outnumbered men.

For these women who worked as housewives, this was a unique experience. They were excited by the material that Al-Iraqiya presented. Using a course from the IIII-designed Women’s Advocacy curriculum, Al-Iraqiya covered all the international women’s agreements and how these related to the articles on women’s rights in the new constitution. Al-Iraqiya discussed the role that women’s advocacy groups could play in changing the position of women in Iraq and how the constitution supported this. After the lecture, two of the women asked if there was any way they too could work to encourage women’s rights. Al-Iraqiya connected the women to The Organization of Love and Prosperity, an IIII-partner CSO. The two women are now members.

IIII must overcome numerous obstacles as it works to develop capable women leaders and build a network of Civil Society Organizations that will continue to advocate for the rights of women. III is making significant progress on all fronts, including dismantling age-old perceptions about a woman’s role in society. Through training, forums, workshops, and awareness-raising activities, III is succeeding case by case and village by village.

A Real Accomplishment

2006-02-09T19:36:00.000+03:00

After returning from my R&R, I'm not happy to be back. Life in the compound hasn't changed any since I left, and that's exactly what bothers me. My daily activities could not be more routine here. Variety involves choosing between the two restaurants in the compound, or maybe what drink I'll order at the bar. There are plenty of interesting people and I do have great co-workers, but a perfectly normal activity like taking a walk is not an option. I'm tired of running on the treadmill and would like to go for a real jog. The contrast between the serendipity of my R&R and life in the compound is irritating. After only a few days at a hostel in Bangkok, I feel like I know the city much better than Baghdad, where I have been living for more than three months.

And what do I have to show for my time here, besides being completely unfamiliar with the city where I'm living? Sure, my supervisor is pleased with my work and everyone says I'm making an important contribution to the team. However, one of the major reasons I came here was because I wanted my efforts to help the Iraqi people, as naive and saccharine as that might sound. In theory, the reports I write every day are an important part of the reconstruction efforts and without them additional funds for the project might be withheld. Yet this is a tenuous connection. More aid might not be spent, but it would likely be spent the same way regardless of who penned the reports. Confined to the compound, I also don't have the satisfaction of seeing the beneficiaries. I learn about it second hand, from our Iraqi staff. Thought its not fair for me to complain about this, becuase I did know what it would be like.

So I'm pleased that an Iraqi girl is now being treated for her injuries. I wrote a letter to doctors whose contacts I found over the internet asking if they might be willing to provide surgery free of charge. I first approached doctors who worked on Extreme Makeover. The few that responded said that I needed doctors who specialized in reconstructive surgery, not cosmetic surgery. Eventually, one of the Extreme Makeover doctors talked to a friend, who agreed to do the surgery. She is now being treated at UCLA.

Reading over this short article about her treatment, I'm astonished at its inaccuracy. Or at least, how much the coverage differs from my understanding of her case. Her family wasn't fleeing an attack, as the article describes. The mother was killed and Marwa was wounded when their house was bombed. Some funds were already given to the family to repair their home.

Its also strange that this case has not generated more attention. Its just as significant as the Iraqi girl who was born with birth defects and treated in Atlanta, arguably even moreso. With Marwa's story, the American doctors are rectifying a mistake by that occurred because of their military's action. Surely there is more of an obligation to treat those cases first. I think the press person at Childspring International deserves some congratulations.

What is unfortunate is that there are so many more Iraqis that need to be connected to doctors who will help. Marwa had been injured for almost 2 years, but no one bothered to find a doctor who would perform the surgery. When I looked for organizations who had experience with this sort of thing, I learned that there is really a shortage of patients who have been brought to the attention of international organizations and that there are few individuals who can manage the logistics. But there are plenty of doctors who need to be connected to patients. In fact, this organization guarantees that it can help any Iraqi child who cannot be treated inside Iraq.

Working on the case is probably the most satisfying thing that I have done during my time in Iraq. Not only because my efforts really did help someone, but because I was able to take real initiative. I wasn't tasked with the assignment or given directions. I need more professional opportunities like this, and I doubt they're to be found in Iraq. They may not exist in development at all. Of course, its silly for me to ask for a role like this, as having it handed to me would destroy its appeal.

Pressing +964 frequently

2006-01-08T22:03:00.000+03:00

Although everyone working in Iraq owns a cellphone, communicating with staff in other parts of the country is very difficult. The poor reception is not the major problem.

As I understand it, there are four cell phone networks operating in Iraq. Each has a different area of coverage. When the CPA arrived, it designated the south for a network called Atheer. It was decided that the central region, including Baghdad, would be operated by Iraqna, which is owned by the Egyptian company, Orascom. In the north, both Kurdish factions have their own networks. Barzani's family owns a company that operates the Korek network used in and around Arbil. Phones in the PUK-controlled areas, such as Sulaymaniya, run on AsiaCell.

Depending on the network, the cellphone might work outside its designated area. An Atheer cellphone can be used in Baghdad to call another Atheer number in Basra. Calls between networks require making an out of country call, so it requires fewer digits to call Arbil from Baghdad than to call the US. My Arabic has slightly improved from memorizing the "you've dialed a wrong number" message that I hear in Arabic. I regularly forget to remove the zero after entering the country code.

One way to remedy this problem is to use Skype, which is free and often has a clearer connection than Iraqi cellphones. Unfortunately, all of our staff do not use Skype.

Rain in Baghdad

2006-01-07T22:56:00.000+03:00

Its raining in Baghdad, and several of my Iraqi friends have told me that they're pleased. I didn't see too many umbrellas carrying umbrellas, and no one is bothered by being wet. Since there's not alot of outdoor activities going on in Baghdad, few plans are affected.

According to this article, most residents of the Gulf seem to have the same appreciation for rain.

Happy Army Day!

2006-01-07T00:12:00.000+03:00

Today (or what is now yesterday) is Army Day in Iraq. The holiday celebrates the creation of the Iraqi Army in 1921 and we have a two-day weekend to commemorate the occasion. I heard that there was a ceremony in the Green Zone, but in our compound everything was the same.

Most Iraqi guards now providing security for international organizations worked in Saddam's army. Many were fighting American troops before the government fell. Westerners working in security treat Iraqi guards with varying levels of trust, but there's never complete confidence. Iraqis are usually assigned to the less desirable posts such as guarding the perimeter of the compound. In some companies, when they're asked to go on a mission they will have to relinquish their cellphones to diminish the risk that they might disclose their whereabouts to the insurgents.

The number two on the security team for a project used to be a battalion commander in the Iraqi Army. He is a lankly fellow who wears aviator sunglasses and loves to tell dirty jokes. He fits the image of someone who says that tearing out fingernails is not truly painful torture. When he was fighting American troops in Anbar he knew his unit would lose. The unit disbanded and he ended up in Fallujah. Speaking mediocre English, he was hired as the security manager for a relief organization that had just started operations in the city. Now that ex-Baathists are being welcomed into the army, he's not going. There's no way the pay of the Iraqi Government will match his current salary.

The face of American contractors

2006-01-05T23:23:00.000+03:00

The ride to the airport runs through a barren, swampy, barbedwire mess. There are a few billboards, but the several signs announcing GBG Logistics are the most conspicuous. These are the only advertisements for American contractors in Iraq that I've seen outside the Green Zone and other restricted areas. There's no contact information on the signs, so I wonder if they're advertisements to generate new business or intended to credit GBG with work done nearby. Its unclear.

GBG's work in Iraq, like the signage, was all bluster. GBG's owner is now charged in federal court. How long until these signs are taken down? GBG must be the worst company to represent American contractors to Iraqis.

W-allahi, ana mamnoon!

2006-01-04T23:32:00.000+03:00

It's never vital that I use Arabic in the office, but I'll still occasionally throw around the Arabic I know. I think it can be useful to break the ice and mildly disarming for my Iraqi co-workers. Some of my colleagues are reluctant to speak English freely for fear of making mistakes. Working with an American who tries his best with their language demonstrates that perfect command of the language is not required. After I receive something I ask for, I'll sometimes respond with "mamnoon," which is colloquial gulf Arabic for "I'm grateful." More often than not, it elicits a smile in response.

The $18.4 billion from international humanitarians

2006-01-03T22:21:00.000+03:00

The Washington Post has another article on reconstruction. I'm struck by the end of the article, when Knickermeyer quotes several Iraqis. The Iraqis scoff at the suggestion that the US has done any meaningful reconstruction out of the Green Zone. But these comments shouldn't be surprising or discouraging.

I bet if she rephrased her question "have you seen any reconstruction activities - funded by Americans, well-meaning individuals, or the international community?" the response would be much different.

Most Iraqis who are helped by reconstruction projects in Iraq don't know that the source of funds is American taxpayers. On all the projects I've worked on, the Iraqis who handle most of the interactions with Iraqi beneficiaries rarely reveal that they're paid by the American government. Our staff seldom, if ever, disclose that credit should be given to the US

For example, when an Iraqi entrepreneur approaches a grant-making project, there is a long discussion that follows regarding the eligibility of the individual and the viability of the business plan. After sometimes months of negotiations, the business owner might receive thousands of dollars, but will probably not know that it comes from Americans.

There are a range of explanations that Iraqi staff have told me they give when beneficiaries ask about the source of the funds for their project. The most common seems to be that the source is international humanitarians. Sometimes it's the international Christian community, if the beneficiaries are Christian. Other staff will attribute the funds to the Iraqi government, and leave it at that. Occasionally - rarely - they will say that US government is paying their salary and covering the cost of the project.

Ideally, every project funded by USAID, US Army Corps of Engineers, or the State Department would have a big logo of the agency and an American flag. But that's just not feasible here. The likelihood that the project would be targeted by bad guys is too high. So we have to be satisfied that the project will do good, even if the good won't necessarily be attributed to the US government. In some cases, the beneficiaries are strategically misled about the donor. For example, I've heard that in Sadr City, where hundreds of millions of US reconstruction dollars have been spent, Muqtada actively seeks credit for American projects.

Sponsors of a mosque in northern Iraq can be more candid about their funding.

Reconstruction, a failure?

2006-01-02T22:41:00.000+03:00

Its too bad that this blog will no longer be updated after the author's upcoming departure. Its also unfortunate that he's so down about the state of reconstruction in Iraq. I don't think everything is going swimmingly - far from it - but I'm not not about to call reconstruction efforts a total failure just yet.

I don't want to be an apologist for the situation. Jay Garner spoke at a conference just after he was replaced by Bremmer, and I nearly laughed at his comments. He was not a failure running Iraq, he explained, because none of the awful things that were supposed to occur ever came to pass. Contrary to certain predictions, there were few refugees after the war ended and there were no medical outbreaks of typhoid or malaria or any of the other diseases people said were sure to happen if the US invaded. So he was not a failure, because none of these things happened. Maybe he could take credit for disarming Saddam, too.

But I think it makes sense to take a step back and look at reconstruction projects for what they are. Projects, not magic bullets. They're not going to seal borders, stop foreign insurgents, or prevent car bombs. I don't think that the presence or absence of the insurgency should be the yardstick to measure the effectiveness of these projects. Would anyone blame French reconstruction efforts if the Ivory Coast has another coup and civil war? What if war breaks out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, does that indicate the failure of UN peacekeeping operations? No, I think in both situations its acknowledged that there are much greater forces at work that reconstruction and reconciliation projects cannot change. Such is the case for Iraq, too. These projects can only accomplish so much, and suddenly stopping the insurgency is not a legitimate expectation.

These projects should be expected to get the water flowing, the oil pumping, and the electricity running, and it is to the great discredit of reconstruction efforts that some of these basics do not significantly exceed prewar levels. Though, its worthwhile to keep in mind the level of coordination that's required for these projects. Its massive, and when travel is so restricted by security concerns, its difficult to plan anything too carefully. If US coordination domestically can't get the California power grid sorted out and keep the power running there, can it really be expected to have Baghdad functioning all the time, too?

It is also important to keep in mind that reconstruction and relief efforts are regularly criticized. I would be very interested to find one instance when public perception of the results of reconstruction were overwhelmingly positive. There is tremendous disapproval of Katrina and tsunami relief efforts. Both relief activities received a huge outpouring of aid, and both seem to have come up short in the eyes of their donors. The same is true for the Pakistan earthquake. In some ways, this criticism is understandable. The level of destruction is so vast that we expect a response that produces immense results. But most of the time that's just not possible.

I don't know the legitimate expectations for our work in Iraq, just as I don't have a clear definition for what constitutes "failure." But I do know we're helping many Iraqis daily, and working on many important projects that will yield results for years to come. Much of it is sustainable, too.

New Years, Baghdad

2006-01-01T21:46:00.000+03:00

The New Year arrived with a bang in Baghdad. I was comfortably in bed this morning, sleeping off the aftereffects of last night's BBQ - or Braai, as the South Africans call it. Around 9 or so, the room shakes from the loudest explosion I have ever heard. A barrage of gunfire follows, clearly emanating from inside the compound. The sound was loud enough that I approached the window expecting to see one of the buildings in our compound destroyed.

A plume of smoke was rose from the street. The bomb was a few hundred meters away from the compound. The suicide bomber had targeted a passing police convoy, not our compound. Our security staff says that two Iraqi policemen were killed, but the media is not reporting any casualties among the dead.

I heard many of the eight bombs explode, which is more than I've heard in any day before. I've noted before that general perceptions of the dangers in Iraq do not match the reality, and this is especially strong evidence for that point. Today's bombings read like a footnote, but they were frighteningly close. Not unexpected. I received many emails asking me if I was alright after the Amman bombings, though I was in Baghdad at the time. All of today's emails are asking me "how was your new years?"

Palm trees, blast walls, and jersey barriers

2005-12-31T01:48:00.000+03:00

Palm trees abound in Baghdad, but concrete T-walls and jersey barriers may be more ubiquitous. Every building with any security will establish its perimeter with blast walls. Most of the walls are at least 10 feet high and a couple feet thick. Our compound has an outer perimeter of blast walls and a second layer that surrounds each building. As another precaution to prevent suicide bombers, cars entering the compound weave through a series of jersey barriers, too.

I was curious where all this concrete comes from. Today, I learned the answer. The military base near Baghdad houses a factory which manufactures the structures.

Forwarded Emails

2005-12-30T01:21:00.000+03:00

Since I've been in Iraq, I have received an astounding number of emails alerting me to both potential viruses and supposedly vital, previously unknown information. All were false.

The first email I received told me to be on the lookout for an email about September 11. This email, the false warning told me, would contain a virus. I tried to explain why the email was a hoax when I spoke with the IT manager, who forwarded the email. Well what if the sender attached a virus afterwards? he asked. How do you know that all emails sent with that subject line will not contain a virus? I did not have a solid explanation. I repeated what I knew was true: the warning was a hoax.

Not all these emails were sent by Iraqis. The British security manager of a project I worked on a few months ago sent me an email that seems to be the combination of two urban legends. It alleged that Oliver North suggested Osama was an imminent threat years before 9/11 and that the Israelis had previously captured Mohammed Atta. I don't know what one can conclude from the security manager's willingness to trust these emails and forward them without further verification.

The latest email I received must be the most ludicrous. I am warned that if I don't forward the email to 20 people, my Yahoo! account will be shut down. I knew that the email was false and I did not need to check on its veracity, but I did anyway. What's surprising is the number of recipients who forwarded this email before it reached me. It was successfully forwarded though dozens of mailboxes.

The Millions in the Long Run

2005-12-28T23:27:00.001+03:00

Professor Cole offers 10 myths the American public believes about the war in Iraq. Most of his analysis is sound, but I would take issue with number nine. He contends that the massive amounts of money spent in the restive governorates has done little to win the support of the people.

It's true that there is strident opposition to the American presence in the three main Sunni province. But its worth considering how much worse the situation might look like if not for American aid. There was speculation that after the last assault on Falluja that there would be a massive humanitarian crisis. Though the number of deaths is unknown, its safe to say that aid, despite its shortcomings, did mitigate the effects.

Of course, it could be pointed out that American involvement caused the crisis in the first place and that the net effect on support for the US was negative. But in the case of Falluja aid, the support was in the form of food, medical supplies, shelters and provisions for other immediate needs. The bulk of aid into the Sunni provinces is in the form of traditional development assistance, such as job creation programs, trainings, and infrastructure repair.

While its easy to assess the initial cost of this aid, the real value takes years to appear. A training program that equips Iraqis with the skills to participate in a local council will not yield dividends for a long time. But the possible contribution to the long-term stability of a democratic society is invaluable. If the insurgency is fueled by the economic calculus that Cole suggests, these programs increase the costs that the insurgency must pay to achieve its aims.

Its also a mistake to confuse the support for American presence in Iraq and support for American aims in Iraq. Even if the majority of the population of Anbar does encourage IED attacks on American troops, this should not be taken to mean that they oppose a stable, democratic Iraq. As Cole notes, their aims are nationalistic, which is different from anti-democratic, Islamist, or authoritarian. The aid will not quell nationalist aspirations, which will only be satiated by American military withdrawal. But the millions spent in the Sunni governorates now will encourage the development of a stable, democratic Iraq and bolster its supporters long after the American troops have left and aid levels have declined.

And now for something completely different: When one of my Iraqi coworkers took a break from working toward Iraq's long-term stability, I was forwarded this fun game. I scored a 670.

Watching the Watchdogs

2005-12-28T03:41:00.000+03:00

Before the CPA dissolved, it left Iraq with an NGO law regulating the operation of the third sector. This is the key law on the books and it is likely that the new government, once in office, will pass a new law modeled after the CPA's.

The government has a legitimate interest in maintaining records on NGOs operating in Iraq. If for no other reason than their tax status, some oversight is reasonable. However, there is the possibility that these laws will eventually be used to restrict NGOs that do not have the favor of the government. In Iraq, the risk is particularly acute. Once the new government is formed, the parties in the coalition will be assigned operation of the ministries. The political party which wins the agency ultimately responsible for oversight could apply the laws to disadvantage NGOs that do not support their agenda. Right now the Ministry of Planning is charged with administering NGOs, but there are calls for the creation of a new, more independent government agency.

The risk that the law will be applied with political motivations should not be the only concern. Under the CPA, there were bureaucratic obstacles. Difficulties with registration required that the law be amended. Why does the law require that registrations be submitted in Arabic, Kurdish, and English, but the law is only available in Arabic and English? Each one of these regulations could be grounds for the government to shut down an NGO.

Right now, NGOs throughout the country are proposing ways that the new law can balance their interests and the government's.

Security Precautions

2005-12-27T07:25:00.000+03:00

Non-Iraqi Arabs are being denied entry at Baghdad International Airport. Presumably, this is a security precaution to prevent would-be insurgents from disrupting the election. One of my co-workers is Egyptian, and when he arrived at the airport a couple days after the election he was sent back on the next plane to Cairo. Egypt Air flights from Cairo to Baghdad are now an odd mix of Iraqis, Nepalis, Westerners, and Egyptians who are fortunate enough to be able to travel on another passport. I am curious if this applies to women, who are less likely to fit the profile of an insurgent. The policy is expected to change after the new year or when the election results are official, whichever comes first.

The Beautiful Flowers in the Garden

2005-12-26T01:56:00.000+03:00

It's difficult to keep the history of Christians in Iraq straight. As I understand it, there are two main sects, the Assyrians and the Chaldeans. I've also met a couple of Christian Iraqis who said that they were Armenian, and another who said she was Eastern Orthodox.

There's also a community of Dominicans. I don't know where they fit in theologically, but they are active. I met with one of the friars, who is planning to create the first Open University In Iraq to provide a free, secular, adult education. The friar was enthusiastic that his new institution would stem extremism in Iraq.

Most Iraqi Christians, who comprise a significant portion of our local staff, will quickly mention their religion to me. I am told that in the "Christian" language, which is probably Assyrian, my first name translates to mean "have" if you place an emphasis on the first vowel.

Some Christians have positive things to say about Saddam, besides his ability to maintain stability in Iraq. Once, Saddam allegedly was asked how he felt about Christian emigration from Iraq. He said that it would be as if all the beautiful flowers in a garden were suddenly picked from him. Most Christians seem to believe this account is accurate, but I haven't been able to find reference of it anywhere.

Secret Iraqi Santa

2005-12-25T03:33:00.000+03:00

We had a rousing Christmas celebration. All of the staff - Muslim and Christian - participated in the festivities. A lavish, buffet-style meal was followed by dancing.

My Iraqi co-workers planned the event. About a week ago, they went around the office asking for ten thousand dinars (about six dollars) to pay for event. I gladly contributed, eager to see what would result. The next day, the planners visited me again. I forget exactly how they communicated it to me, but it was clear that they wanted me to participate in a gift exchange, too.

My co-workers managed to arrange the participation of the PSDs in the gift exchange, which meant that there was a wide range of gifts beneath the tree. The PSDs and other foreigners like myself were limited in what we could bring. We're not able to go shopping on the streets of Baghdad like Iraqis, so purchases were limited to items from the comissaries (or the PX, in the argot of Iraq) at military bases. Iraqis seem to like to give porcelain or glass figurines in heart shapes, or other tchotchkes.

I don't know who chose my name from the basket, but its clear that it was a PSD - I received a utility flashlight that could only be purchased at the PX. For my gift, I asked one of my Iraqi co-workers if she could purchase something for me to give. Thanks to her efforts, I gifted a blue and silver candle holder.

I suggested to some of my Iraqi co-workers that next year we might be able to have a festivus, too, accompanied by a festivus pole. One co-worker understood the allusion. The festivus pole would probably more closely conform with the Muslim tendency towards austerity in religious representation than a Christmas tree.

The Turkish Engineer

2005-12-24T00:56:00.000+03:00

A few weeks ago I invited an Iraqi friend and former co-worker to join Friendster. He was about to participate in HI5, a popular social networking site in the Arab world, but said that he was more interested in meeting Western women. I encouraged him to join Friendster instead, and showed him how to set up his profile.

I checked on his profile a few days ago, and noticed that very little of the information was accurate. It said that he was a Turkish engineer, not an Iraqi doctor. None of the women on the site would want to date an Iraqi, he said. If he were a Kuwaiti or hailed from a similarly wealthy country then he would be honest.

I told him that there were plenty of reasons he should say he's Iraqi, and be proud. Few women on the site have any opportunities to meet real Iraqis or Arab men. And he has plenty of selling points in his own right. How many men on the site have performed hundreds of successful appendectomies under possibly the most brutal dictator of the 21st Century? Could women find candid, funny assessments of life in Baghdad from a first-hand experience anywhere else? He said that he would change his profile and put a picture, which he said he was reluctant to do.

I hope that all my female friends reading this will click through to his profile, drop him a note, and add him as a friend. He can whoop your ass in ping pong, too.

Are we encouraging Mexican immigration, too?

2005-12-23T00:35:00.000+03:00

I regularly hear suggestions from Iraqis that Americans have ulterior motives in their country. The evidence that is most often raised is the state of Iraq's borders and the presence of the insurgency. Under Saddam, Iraq's borders were secure. It was difficult to enter from Iran and there were no infiltrators from Syria. Because America is the most powerful country in the world, the argument goes, it is surely capable of securing Iraq's borders. As America has not been able to secure Iraq's borders, it must have an interest in allowing the insurgents to flow into Iraq. The conclusion is that America is promoting instability in Iraq.

A few nights ago, I had a conversation with some Canadians who believed something similar. The reason that US forces were not able to secure the borders was because the US government lacked will, not ability. America does not appreciate how important Iraq is, they said. If the US did understand the importance of Iraq, more troops would be deployed, the borders would be secured, and the insurgency would be killed.

I have heard accounts about how easy it is to cross from Iraq to Syria. Iraqis who have made the journey tell me that with a little planning you could stash most anything in truck and carry it into Iraq, including bomb parts.

I haven't travelled to Iraq overland, but a quick glance at any map shows how vast Iraq's borders are. When I hear these arguments, I listen. I sometimes point out that Iraq was a police state under Saddam. Infiltrators would be limited in what they could attack even if they were able to enter the country.

And how do you find Baghdad?

2005-12-21T22:39:00.000+03:00

Not too long after we first shake hands, Iraqis regularly ask me "and how do you find Baghdad?" The question is understandable, as most of our staff have spent their whole lives in Baghdad. I'm sure I would ask the same question of anyone born 6000 miles away residing in the middle of my hometown.

I'm about as well equipped to respond as, say, an ant in an ant farm that is queried "How do you like the windowsill?" Its similar to asking Abdullah Ocalan "How do you find life on the beach?" My frame of reference is so limited.

I can't think of an answer that sounds right. If I say "well, I'm comfortable here in this artificial environment, it's really not too bad," I present myself as elitist and overpriveledged, accentuating the differences between us. If I say "Baghdad's awful, the weather is horrible, there are all these bombings, and I'm penned in," I sound ungrateful and overcritical. Most of the time, I say "It's sad, but I have no idea what Baghdad is like" which now that I think about it is fairly defeatist. My new response is "I'm only beginning to get to know it, why don't you tell me how you find Baghdad?"

If I ever have the opportunity to explore Baghdad, I will first accept the many dinner invitations I have received but been forced to decline.

Life in the Age of Generators

2005-12-20T21:46:00.000+03:00

I remember one of the first times that the electricity went out. I was in a meeting in the office of an official from Salahaddin University in Arbil. He was interested in funding for a range of University initiatives, while my colleagues were curious about the University's honey-making and bee-rearing facilities. When the power stopped, I almost commented on how much the situation had changed. The air conditioning had ceased its humming and the television stopped playing a Kurdish children's program. Everyone else in the meeting continued as if nothing happened.

Now, six or seven months later, if the electricity goes out I seldom notice. When I'm on the computer, it doesn't make a difference, and I never watch TV too intently to be bothered when it stops. Conversations in a suddenly dark bar continue unimpeded. The electricity typically cuts out every other hour, and the generators restore full capacity in less than a minute. Some of my coworkers find the constant buzz of the generators annoying, but I find the neighbor's chickens more bothersome. If I fall asleep with the television blaring, the inevitable outage serves as my sleep button.

Weapons of Mass Discussion?

2005-12-20T01:25:00.000+03:00

In last night's speech, Bush said in passive terms that he was wrong about the presence of WMD's in Iraq. However, several ex-Marines who provided security on a project I worked on disagree with him on this point. Iraq is so expansive that there are still many places Saddam could have buried his weapons, they point out. My own observations corroborate this. Gazing out from the airplane window, the Western desert seems much more vast than California, to which Iraq is often compared geographically. The reservists also have seen the landscape of Iraq shift. A burned vehicle left on the road between Baghdad and Tikrit can be half covered in sand in less than two weeks. Finally, I am told that there are still weapons caches being captured. A few months ago, I heard that thousands of armaments were found in a house just meters from the walls of the Green Zone.

The 26 million beneficiaries

2005-12-19T09:32:00.000+03:00

How do you evaluate the effectiveness and success of a development project? I asked someone who was responsible for oversight of projects similar to our own. It didn't take long for him to respond. "Cost-per-beneficiary," he answered. I forget what he said was a good rate as we were casually chatting in the compound's bar. I think that he said that in Iraq there was a range between $28 and $55 per beneficiary. This means that a project which has 1,000 beneficiaries will cost between $28,000 and $55,000.

The costs don't seem atypical for Iraq, though it surprises me that the cost per beneficiary figures would be prized. There are definitions for how to define a beneficiary, but organizations often inflate these numbers. Rarely have the number of beneficiaries actually been counted individually. No one is in a position to carefully verify the numbers provided. Most of the figures are, at best, estimates. A project with multiple activities can count the number of beneficiaries from each activity, which means that some individuals will appear in the total count multiple times. I heard that some organizations have counted more beneficiaries than the total population of Iraq!

Evaluating the cost-per-beneficiary also does not take into account the level of benefit. For example, one activity will reopen a school with improved facilities and halve the class size of the students. Another activity will cement an already operable, but unpaved road. The costs might be comparable. In most cases, everyone who regularly uses the road will be considered a beneficiary, which could be in the thousands. Repairing a school will provide much a much greater benefit for the students than the road will provide for the residents. The school may fit better with the long-term development objectives for the country. However, a straight 'cost-per-beneficiary' figure does not take this into account and would likely favor the road.

The 24-hour flu

2005-12-19T09:31:00.000+03:00

I usually try anything served to me, at least once. In Iraq, I’ve tasted a serving of rice and sheep testicles and enjoyed the traditional Baghdadi dish masgouf, fried carp caught from the pristine Tigris. On occasion, I had indigestion, but was never ill.

Until yesterday. I began to feel nauseous in the late afternoon and told a co-worker that I probably would not be eating dinner with her. My first visit to the bathroom followed soon after our conversation, and I spent the rest of the evening and most of the night expelling whatever it was through every available orifice.

The rest of the team was supportive. The grants manager took my temperature with the palm of her hand. The DCOP insisted that a doctor be called. I knew that the training specialist had a doctorate, but it was only when she offered to diagnose me that I learned it was in medical science. Even the house guard asked if there was anything he could do. I thought it was a 24 hour flu and that there was no need for most of their precautions. As my fever dies and my appetite is restored, it appears I was right.

I’m at a loss for what could have caused this, because I didn’t eat anything unusual. I didn’t eat breakfast and for lunch went for a buffet at one of the compound’s restaurants. For dessert, I ate some ice cream I purchased from the corner store. Often my Iraqi co-workers will bring food they have prepared, and offer it around. Its always tasty, though I think I will decline for the rest of the week. Now, I’m sticking with canned soup purchased from Camp Victory.

Internet in Iraq

2005-12-17T10:24:00.000+03:00

In Iraq, connecting to the internet is occasionally difficult. We work from a wireless connection accessible throughout the office. Since there are no DSL lines in Iraq, the signal is transferred by satellite. As I understand it, a receiver sitting on our roof transmits the information to an internet hub. Many advertisements are in German. I think that our transmission, after leaving Iraq, is transferred into space and arrives somewhere in Germany. Though this is circuitous, the connection is, most of the time, very fast.

It seems that every international organization working in Iraq uses the same method. When I look at other wireless connections from our office, I see signals from Dyncorp, IFES, and others.

This is a lucrative business. I don’t know what company we use or their rate, but I heard JPI charges over $5,000 a month for the connection. Their advertisements are found in the seat pockets of Airserv flights. Most of our Iraqi staff have internet at home. Their connections are dialup.

The internet connection was inoperable for most of yesterday, following a fierce storm the night before last. It started thundering at around 2 AM, followed by torrential rain, and stopped a little before dawn. I was awoken several times. Our DCOP who has worked in Iraq for several years said he has never seen anything like it. The connection has not been restored, and I am working off an errant signal emanating somewhere in the compound. The orange trees, which are abundant in the compound, also bore the brunt of the storm. There are now oranges strewn about, but unfortunately they're not ripe yet.

Election Day Haircuts and Posters

2005-12-15T18:55:00.000+03:00

Today, when Iraqis went to vote for their first permanent government, not much was different in our compound. My Iraqi co-workers had the day off, the third of a five-day break. But the Kurdish guards who monitor the perimeter were on duty. The corner stores were also open. Outside the office and inside the compound, the only difference from yesterday was that the fellow who sells me orange juice had indelible ink on his forefinger. He voted for list 740, the Christian list, and he said that he would get me a poster.

Mid afternoon, I ventured outside the compound with the regional manager, a genial, rotund Jordanian. Our ostensible purpose was to get a haircut, but I wanted to see what it was like on election day. Despite the warnings of one of my coworkers, we went without security and strolled down the main street.

There was little traffic on the road, mostly busses. It appeared they were taking people to vote. Every few blocks the street would be roped off around voting centers. Some had groups of men around my age congregating around the perimeter. One voting center had a makeshift band with drums and shrill trumpet.

The campaign materials are much different in Kurdistan. In Baghdad, most of the posters feature the candidate's face and the number of the slate. Both compete for space on the poster. Up North, the posters have a cultural relevance to them. One depicts a married couple with the husband wearing the distinctive Kurdish garb. The list number is not prominent, perhaps because anyone who sees it already knows the number. Another poster has a picture of the famous tel in Arbil. I did not see Talabani or Barzani's face anywhere.

My favorite poster has what might be a Kurdish princess adorned with red, white, and green facepaint - the colors of the Kurdish flag. After the trim, we spent some time trying to safely remove posters, while making sure no one took our efforts the wrong way. It was nearly five o'clock, when the polls close, and some passerbys lended a hand.

Campaigning in the information age

2005-12-14T18:34:00.000+03:00

With the elections set to take place tomorrow, my phone has been ringing off the hook. I have received over a dozen text messages alerting me to "listi 730." There were some other words, too, all transliterated from Kurdish. It seems that I've had more encouragement to vote for the main Kurdish list than I have for any party in the US, in any election. The telephone lines were reportedly jammed because of these solicitations, and I when I tried to make an in-country call, I reached a recording advising me in three different languages to try again later. Like myself, everyone working in Iraq appreciates that however aggressive the campaigning has been there is no significant violence to report.

In Arbil, where I am now, there are plenty of posters advertising the 730 list. I only noticed one poster for 729, the Kurdish Islamic Union. They're one of the only other Kurdish rival to the 730 list, and their offices were recently burned and looted in one of the few instances of election-related instability.

The persistent campaigning isn't unique to Kurdistan. Before we left for Arbil on the 11th, I received several messages in Arabic encouraging me to vote.

And if they win the World Cup?

2005-12-13T22:03:00.000+03:00

Two nights ago, I was working late and heard gunfire. This is not unusual in Baghdad. Its rare that a night passes where sporadic shots are not heard in the distance. But the firing did not stop after a few rounds. It escalated, and soon I couldn't tell where the shots were coming from. We were surrounded by gunfire, and it was loud enough that I thought grenades and mortars were exploding, too. Some of the shots sounded like they were coming from inside the compound.

Was this it? Were the naysayers right and Iraq was, finally, devolving into chaos? I moved away from the window and into the hallway.

I saw the Nepali guard wearing his bulletproof vest, which I have never seen him do. He clenched his Kalashnikov and peered out the window. I looked over his shoulder. It appeared that small red rockets or maybe some sophisticated bullets were flying through the air. This surprised me, as I didn't think this would be the choice weaponry of the new civil war.

The gunfire subsided after 30 minutes. I'm not the only one who mistook celebrations of Iraq's win over Syria for a new phase of the conflict. The rockets were "tracer rounds." Its normal that Iraqis respond this way to a small victory, a coworker told me, because they have so little to celebrate.

Immigration and the Baghdad Stock Exchange

2005-12-12T22:53:00.000+03:00

A Baghdadi Christian asked me if I thought he should immigrate from Iraq to the US. He had reason to believe that a Green Card was imminent. His source was not a sham website that requires users to pay money for access, which on occasion Iraqis have asked me about. Instead, he had official correspondence from the American embassy.

Should he start a new life in the US? He asked me as if I really really had some important insight on the subject.

I paused, thinking about how to answer this. I responded with pragmatic questions, avoiding the issue of whether Iraq had a future or not. "Are you sure that you can make it in the US?" "Are you ready for the adjustment?" "Do you know what sort of work you want to do?" He was confident that he could live in the US, and that the adjustment would not be difficult. He speaks decent English and knows computers. He has some, but not many, distant relatives who live in the states. He might settle near Detroit, probably in Dearborn.

My own thoughts on the future of Iraq are nebulous. I see it as unlikely that it will significantly exceed the performance of any of its neighbors. The best case scenario may be that it will become a country like Jordan. It will have a stable government that has support from the people, and a decent economy that is integrated to the region. There is a significant risk of a coup resulting in a government like Syria's, or an Islamic government similar to Iran.

The question is in some ways like asking me if I should be in Iraq. I'm working here on rebuilding the country, and if I believe progress is impossible, shouldn't I pack up my bags and go home? Who wants to participate in an exercise in futility? This is why I didn't give him a direct answer. My private response is that even if Iraq has an uphill battle ahead that it may lose, that does not change the fact that our work does help the Iraqi people. This help is needed, regardless of the long-term trajectory of the country. But I didn't want the rest of the Iraqi staff to know that I had significant doubts about the future of the country as a whole.

He felt that Iraq had the trappings of a great country, such as a strong agricultural base and oil. It might be a mistake to leave that behind. As I talked to him more, he was more concerned about missing out on the Baghdad Stock Exchange. An Iraqi bank has shares which sell for less than 100 ID (1500 Iraqi Dinar = US Dollar) and a significant stake is about to be purchased by HSBC. How could he leave that opportunity behind? He already owns thousands of shares, and since only Iraqis can own stock, he would have sell his holdings. He also asked if I thought the Iraqi Dinar would strengthen against the dollar. I forget how the conversation ended. I remember mentioning the risk of insider trading.

We still keep in touch. It looks like he will immigrate.

More zeroes to a single organization?

2005-12-12T01:03:00.000+03:00

Most of our work here is devoted to the immediate requirements of our project. However, there is discussion of the long term US objectives in Iraq and reconstruction policy. Though our project will run until June 2007, we wonder about our friends at other organizations.

For most, the future is uncertain. Rumour has it that all reconstruction activities will be centralized under a single contract. The release of a new grant lends creedence to this. In terms of US foreign aid, the funds discussed in this proposal are mind-boggling. A single organiztion will be awarded more money to spend in Iraq over four years than were spent on all of Africa in 2003. Though some perspective is necessary given the general scale of Iraq reconstruction. Almost every project, including the one that employs me, has more funding than the total support given to most African countries.

This does not make sense to me. Why centralize funding in a single partner? How can a single organization realistically manage so much money? Every contract has a certain risk that the work will be poorly executed or that the contract will be mismanaged. Why not contract with several organizations and diminish the risk of complete failure? Perhaps the costs of coordinating multiple partners is so high that it is more cost-effective to work with a single organization. Its not immediately evident to me how this could be the case. Though the due date for applications is more than one month away, I heard that the partner organization has already been identified.

Andrew Natsios, director of USAID, resigned last week. Maybe he is as baffled as I am. Though the possibility of suddenly working for the State Department is a more likely cause.

Rereading the RFA, I am curious about the 10 strategic cities. I have been told there are 9: Mosul, Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Hilla, Baguba, Najaf, Samarra, Tikrit. Perhaps the remaining one is to be determined based the focus of the "Insurgency" which, curiously, is capitalized.

Arabic in the Office

2005-12-10T22:45:00.000+03:00

My ability in Arabic has not improved since I've been in Iraq. I know more words in Iraqi dialect, but my ability to read and converse is unchanged. As was the case when I arrived, I can make myself understood on basic issues and engage in simple conversations as long as the other person speaks slowly and uses plenty of formal Arabic. I occasionally crack the Arabic textbook I brought, but not as much as I would like.

This is not unusual. I have yet to meet a single Westerner who has learned Arabic during their time here. That's not because there's any shortage of Iraqis to learn from. Instead, most people who work in Iraq are quite satisfied with their current set of skills and see no reason to add another language. I met a water specialist who had worked in Iraq for over six years, before the fall of Saddam, but only had a knowledge of Arabic that was rudimentary at best.

One of our PSDs is fluent. I've heard him speak Arabic more than any other Westerner, including the second in command on our project, who is also fluent. The PSD worked on a development project earlier, and took a job (with a much higher salary) in security once it finished. It comes in handy for him occasionally. When clients arrive at the airport, he talks his way past the arrivals gate, into the baggage claim, and helps with luggage. He was kidnapped once and was able to talk to his captives. The Arabic, he explained, encouraged his release.

There are plenty of opportunities for study. The Arab staff speak to each other in Arabic, but all know English and will use it when they speak to expats. A coworker of mine provided a creative explanation for her indifference to learning Arabic. Its more important that the Iraqis learn and practice their English than we learn Arabic. This is the age of globalization, and English the international language, she said. How thoughtful. And some say Americans working here don't care about Iraqis!

Uncommon Access Card?

2005-12-09T22:00:00.000+03:00

To enter military bases and other restricted areas in Iraq, civilians like myself have been issued a special card by the government. The application process included several weeks of waiting and approvals from numerous government agencies, and even crossed the desk of my housemate. She wrote me a surprised note saying she had seen my paperwork and asking if I was really going to Iraq. A few days before I left I visited Ft. Belvoir, a military base near DC, and received my Common Access Card, in Iraq more commonly referred to as "the DoD."

There are two types of CAC cards floating around. Americans receive cards with a green stripe, others are issued cards with a pink stripe. I should be more specific here. "Others" does not include Iraqis. They're not issued CAC cards as far as I know. They receive passes that are only valid for individual locations, such as the Green Zone.

When I visited a government office in the Green Zone, I left my CAC card as a deposit to ensure that I would return the visitor's badge I was issued. Big mistake, my escort told me. Now it would be more difficult for me to enter his office with my other IDs. The CAC card is your passport, he explained, the only universally recognizable ID in Iraq, and you should never part with it. It also includes a special chip, which is supposedly linked to the blood sample I gave when I was issued the card. I'm dubious of this, but several people have told me that following bombings the chip has been used to identify otherwise unrecognizable remains.

Yesterday I received a government email that said foreigners will no longer be issued their pink cards. Instead, they must "pay for their Iraqi visa when they arrive in Baghdad. The cost in CASH - is $80 plus another $1. The entry visa is valid for 10 days. You will need to work with the local authority to receive an extension of the visa or a resident permit." I've found paying the one dollar entry/exit tax to be a funny excercise. For one dollar or 1000 dinars (66 cents) a very unofficial looking man slaps a stamp on your boarding pass.

Slightly more official-looking figures who check passports will be collecting the $80 dollars. This will affect many people, as there are thousands of contractors. I have heard estimates of 13,000 South African contractors alone. No one seems to know what the implications will be though, including the US government. The email closed: "At this point we do not have further information, but will share with you when we receive new information. We would be most interested in hearing your travelers' experience when they arrive at International Airport."

We're not leaving any time soon

2005-12-08T16:04:00.000+03:00

Yesterday, USAID agreed to a second phase of the project. Our operations are extended a year and will continue to June 2007. This was not too much of a surprise for anyone, as there have been discussions for a while that this would happen. We had an office-wide celebration to commemorate the occasion.

This is the first all-staff gathering that I have been to since I joined. Though we all work in the same building, with approximately 95 employees (excluding security), it is rare that we get everyone together. The building contains two offices - the national headquarters, which occupy the second and third floors, and the regional offices, which are on the first level.

The mood was much more upbeat than I expected. The staff erupted in applause after every speaker and it seemed that everyone (excluding me) took pictures. I don't think I've ever been to a work-related event that was this jubilant. And there were only soft drinks and cake on offer, as captured in the picture, which was taken by a coworker.

Most of the staff will now be employed until the end of the contract. Many of them previously worked for other USAID contractors whose operations were discontinued. I'm sure they're pleased to continue working with us, but what is more important is that they will have jobs. I have not heard any statistics on unemployment lately, but aside from mention of job creation schemes, I notice that this was only briefly discussed in yesterday's speech on the economic conditions in Iraq.

Elvis and Security

2005-12-07T16:28:00.000+03:00

Whenever our security contractors drive us through Baghdad, there are risks that they will take measures similar to what is captured in this video. It appears to be filmed from the last car in a convoy. In several different scenes spliced together, cars approach and a stream of bullets are fired. When I first watched the video, I thought that the gunner did not fire warning shots, but it seems that he does. Elvis plays in the background.

I have never been in a convoy and heard shots fired, though our Personal Security Detachment - the preferred nomenclature for the former soldiers responsible for our safety - do not hesitate when there is a possibility that an approaching car might be a suicide bomber. The last car has a mounted machine gun out the rear window. First, they fire a few warning shots in the air. Next, they shoot the pavement in front of the car. If the vehicle hasn't stopped at that point, they fire on it directly. Aiming at only the engine, I've been reassured. The security contractor who provides our PSDs, Reed, boasts that they're not as trigger-happy as their counterparts at Blackwater or DynCorp.

When I first arrived in Baghdad, I wrote an email to a friend who was also working here. I did not know what it would be like driving from the airport, but I was surprised to find it to be so similar to a military operation. If I were ever in a convoy and Iraqis were killed so that I could travel, I wrote, that would be the end of my stay here. If that tradgedy happened, how could I support my claim that I am here to help the Iraqi people? I don't feel the same way about that now. Maybe its because I have more trust in the abilities of the PSDs than I did before. They're not going to kill Iraqis unnecessarily, even if they do not hold them in the highest regard.

The Gems of Iraqi English

2005-12-06T15:30:00.000+03:00

One of my core responsibilities with this position is improving the writing of local staff. Iraqis working in the field write about their work and the activities of our partner organizations, and I edit it. These tasks are not technically demanding. The key skill - the only skill, perhaps - is a basic knowledge of the English language. However, its sometimes next to impossible to make anything coherent with the writing I'm given.

The staff on this project speak English very well. I can have conversations with all of them and I don't need to change my word choice to help them understand. But their writing is very poor. I have several theories as to why this is the case.

We're dealing with democracy and governance issues. Our projects involve work on "capacity building" and "skills development." These are not easy issues to discuss succinctly. Its much simpler to write about projects that increase wheat yields or repair schools.

Another possible explanation is that this project demands more writing. Unlike other projects, a weekly report is required by USAID. We sometimes ask our local staff to write for the sake of fulfilling this requirement, not because they have something important to communicate. I think this contributes to writing that is, at times, completely meaningless.

Whatever the cause may be, sometimes I receive writing like this.

Project Title: Constitution Awareness. The Location was Diwaniya and the period was two months. Total Amount: $8998. Three of participants had to swim to get in to the workshop site in al-Saniya District because they were late 15 minutes . This project explained that most of people in Iraq have no real awareness in constitution because the x-regime (for 35 years) was dictatorship, this awareness lectures would educate and aware these people, also improve their ideas about the role of constitution and the people role in writing the constitution.

I wonder if the 9K that were spent on the project were misallocated from FEMA's Hurricane relief monies.

Far be it from me to criticize though. I wonder what a kick the Iraqis would get if I ever attempted to write something like this in Arabic.